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THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE WITH RESPECT TO TENDER OFFERS
MODESTO CARVALHOSA *
I. Introduction
The first tender offer in Brazil occurred in October 1971, when Macrosul SA.
sought takeover of Sulbanco [1]. It was at the height of a period during which the
Brazilian Government's Ministry of Finance encouraged the formation of financial
conglomerates [2]. Credit from the Central Bank of Brazil was made readily avail-
able to selected financial institutions [3] who then engaged in private negotiations
with target company controlling shareholders. Sales were negotiated for as much as
ten times the market value of the shares, and non-controlling, or minority share-
holders were rarely invited to tender their shares at the premium price [4]. Contro-
versy arose over this questionable practice of failing to offer the premium to the
minority shareholders, and in 1973 the first legislative proposals to remedy the situ-
ation were brought before the Congress [5]. The following year, the Council of
Economic Development [6] dealt with the issue in its Second National Economic
Development Plan of 1974. Specifically, it called for reformulation of the Corpora-
tion Law with a view toward preventing the controlling shareholders' shares from
obtaining a higher resale value than that of the non-controlling, or minority share-
holders' shares [7]. Thus, it sought to protect the economic interests of the minor-
ity shareholders in the event of a privately negotiated sale of a controlling block of
shares. Pursuant to this Plan, the Economic Development Council issued the follow-
ing guidelines for reformulation of the Corporation Law: "The Law shall require
that the transfer of a substantial portion of the voting capital of a public company
be effected through a tender offer transaction so as to ensure that minority share-
holders receive treatment equal to that received by the controlling shareholders [8]".
A shift away from this policy occurred in June 1976, when the Economic Devel-
opment Council included in its draft Corporation Law a provision that asserted the
right of the controlling shareholders to receive a premium price upon transfer of
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controlling blocks of shares with the exclusion of the minority shareholders [9].
This provision served to underscore the need to protect the minority shareholders
and it was rightfully rejected by the Senate [10]. In its place, the Senate approved
Senator Lehman's proposal which would give minority shareholders the same right
to receive a premium price that the controlling shareholders had- On December 15,
1976, the New Corporation Law [11] was finally enacted, granting equal treatment
to controlling and minority shareholders in the event of a transfer of control of a
public company.
As is evident in this introduction to the Brazilian tender offer regulatory system,
tender offers and their regulation are relatively new events in Brazil. There are no
reported judicial decisions concerning the regulatory legislation, and the various
regulatory authorities have yet to establish clear and dependable guidelines for
policy and enforcement. Thus, the primary purpose of this article is to describe the
tender offer regulatory system and underlying transaction. The concept of corporate
control under Brazilian corporation law affects some of the legislation and so it is
also explained. Finally, some specific issues that have arisen, or are likely to arise
under the system, are also addressed.
2. Regulatory framework
The Brazilian tender offer regulatory system is organized according to types of
tender offers. Basically, tender offer types are characterized by the circumstances
under which they are made. They fall into four groups: transfer of control, acquisi-
tion of control, consolidation of control, and going private. All other types of
tender offers, such as those made for the acquisition of a non-controlling or control
consolidating block of shares, are not specifically regulated in Brazil. Instead, they
are transacted according to general contract law principles.
Transfer of control tender offers, also called "compulsory tender offers", are
required by the Corporation Law to be made to all shareholders whenever the con-
trolling shareholder enters into an agreement to sell his shares to another party,
thereby transferring his control of the corporation. Such offers are not considered
to have been voluntarily made; rather, they are mandatory in the wake of friendly
private negotiations between the controlling shareholder and another party. They
are governed by Part VI. of the Corporation Law, which assigns regulatory respon-
sibility to the National Monetary Council (Conselho Afonetdrio Nacional) and the
Securities Commission (Comissro de Valores Mobilarios). Tender offers made for
acquisition or consolidation of control differ from compulsory offers in that they
are wholly voluntary and are in fact the sole means by which the offeror gains a
controlling block of the corporation's shares. Such offers are extended to all share-
holders at the outset and involve no privately negotiated sales between the offeror
and any shareholder. They are governed by Part VII of the Corporation Law and
regulated by the Securities Commission. Going private tender offers are mandatory
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"any and all' offers for the shares of a target corporation. Thus, they seek out all
shareholders, whether voting or non-voting. This feature, of course, distinguishes
them from compulsory, acquisition of control, and consolidation of control tender
offers which seek out only shareholders who own voting stock. They are governed
by Directive 3 of the Securities Commission, which also governs cancellation of
public company registration.
Compulsory tender offers are administered primarily by the National Monetary
Council [12] whose authority is expressly granted by Article 254 of the Corpora-
tion Law. However, it has delegated much of its day-to-day responsibility to the
Securities Commission [13]. As a result, the compulsory tender offer is governed
directly by two documents: Resolution 401 of the National Monetary Council and
Directive 3 of the Securities Commission. Voluntary tender offers, i.e. acquisition
of control, consolidation of control, and going private tender offers are regulated
directly by the Securities Commission, under authority granted by the Corporation
Law. In addition to these two main regulatory bodies, the stock exchanges (bolsas
de valores) exercise limited regulatory authority over the conduct of their mem-
bers and aid in enforcement of the tender offer law and regulations [14].
The Securities Commission, the regulator with the most pervasive role in the
tender offer regulatory system, is empowered to use numerous enforcement
devices. It may examine the accounting records, books and documents of both indi-
viduals and corporations involved in the tender offer transaction and it may require
such persons to appear at an administrative proceeding to answer questions or pro-
vide additional information. If the Commission determines that there has been a
violation of the Corporation Law, the Securities Commission Law or administrative
regulations, it may impose any of a number of penalties including, but not limited
to, a fine, suspension of an officer of a publicly held corporation, and cancellation
of a company's registration. Appeal of a penalty may be made to the National
Monetary Council which established the procedures by which the Commission con-
ducts its investigations. Criminal action may only be taken by the Attorney Gen-
eral.
3. The Brazilian concept of corporate control and the tender offer regulatory sys-
tem
The Brazilian Corporation Law specifically defines control in terms of exercised
power on the part of an individual, legal entity, group of individuals or groups of
legal entities joined together by a control agreement or under common control. A
controlling shareholder or group of shareholders is one that: (a) has sufficient votes
at general shareholders' meetings to push through the resolutions it wants and to
elect the majority of the company officers, and (b) actually exercises its power to
direct or influence corporate policies and activities [151. Honorary, future, and
intermittent control are insufficient. Consequently, if a majority shareholder
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chooses to remain aloof from corporate affairs, a minotiry shareholder can be a con-
trolling shareholder.
The title of controlling shareholder carries with it statutory obligations and lia-
bilities for abuses of power [16]. Among the former is the duty to respect the inter-
est of all the other shareholders of the corporation and to refrain from damaging
them. Failure to ensure the making of a tender offer to the non-controlling share-
holders in the event of a transfer of control is deemed by law to be a breach of this
duty and subjects the controlling shareholder to Securities Commission penalties.
Thus, it is of critical importance that the Securities Commission and the share-
holders be able to determine who is the controlling shareholder of a corporation
undergoing a negotiated transfer of control.
Transfers of non-controlling, minority blocks of stock can create confusion in
the situation where several non-controlling, minority shareholders knowingly sell
their shares to a party and thereby transfer a number of shares sufficient to bestow
upon the purchaser control of the corporation. It is impossible then to distinguish
between a mere sale of a block of stock and an actual transfer of corporate control.
National Monetary Council Resolution 401 attempts to resolve the difficulty with a
new definition of controlling shareholder [17]. It establishes that the controlling
shareholder can be a minority shareholder or a group of minority shareholders that
is able to gather an absolute majority of votes at the last three shareholders' general
meetings. These meetings need not have occurred within a particular span of time.
This is troublesome because during an ongoing struggle for corporate control share-
holders general meetings could be convened as many as three times within a single
fiscal year. The Resolution approach is troublesome too because it allows a con-
trolling shareholder who has not participated in one of those last three general
meetings to sell his shares without having to comply with the simultaneous tender
offer requirement.
Another issue that arises in connection with the concept of corporate control
relates to the statutory requirement that the controlling shareholder actually use
his power to direct corporate affairs. For the purposes of section 254 of the
corporation law, such requirement must be construed as applied to tile purchaser
and not to the seller of corporate control. Otherwise, a non-controlling majority
shareholder could sell his shares to a party which intends to exert control over the
corporation without complying with the simultaneous tender offer rule. Thus, in
such a situation the parties to the transaction would have to comply with the
simultaneous tender offer rule.
Indirect control of corporations is another situation that raises potential prob-
lems for the regulatory system, especially when it takes the form of a holding com-
pany. For instance, in the event that a holding company disposes of controlling
shares that were part of its assets, the minority shareholders of the controlled
company would be entitled to receive the premium price for their shares. Similarly,
the simultaneous tender offer would be required in the event that the controlling
shareholder sold its interest in the holding company itself. In the latter case, the
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value of the controlled company shares would be deemed equal to that of the
holding company shares.
Negotiated transfers of indirect control might also occur in the situation where a
controlling shareholder organizes a holding company which is incorporated as a
limited liability company and the subscribed capital paid in with controlling shares
of the corporation, assessed at par value. This would undoubtedly be considered a
sale of corporate control, and as such trigger the obligation for the controlling
shareholder to comply with the simultaneous tender offer rule. If the holding com-
pany shares were worth less (because of the company's liabilities) than the con-
trolled company shares, the Securities Commission would determine the price for
the latter. From this amount, the Commission would then deduct the liabilities of
the holding company to arrive at a figure that accurately reflected the value of the
shares owned by the controlled-company shareholders.
4. The tender offer transaction
In order for a tender offer to be made the offeror must arrange to have a fiman-
cial institution act as guarantor for all his financial commitments with respect to
the offer. Thus, for example, if the offeror fails to pay for shares he has agreed to
purchase, the guarantor financial institution will undertake the payment. This so-
called "covenant of warranty" is completely separate from a loan agreement which
the offeror might enter into with a financial institution for purposes of financing
the offer at the outset.
Once the covenant of warranty is arranged, the tender offer must, to become
effective, be announced in the press. An offering document, signed by the offeror
and the investment bank or securities firm guaranteeing payment, serves as the
announcement. Its contents are specified in National Monetary Council Resolution
401 [18] and Securities Commission Directive 3 [19], and include information
about the offeror, the price of the shares sought to be acquired, the offering period,
the method for acceptance of the offer, and the procedure in case the number of
shares tendered exceeds the offeror's expressed limit. It must then be filed with the
Securities Commission within twenty-four hours of its initial publication.
If the offer involves a partial or total exchange of securitites instead of cash, it
must be filed with the Commission prior to its publication in the press. In addition,
the offering document for such a tender offer must describe the structure and such
items as revenue, net income, shareholders equity, capital stock, and book value of
outstanding stock of both the target company and the company whose stocks are
being offered in the exchange. This of course is intended to facilitate comparison
between the companies. Also, the offering document must describe the changes in
or evolution of the market price of the shares that are the object of the tender
offer. Only corporations with outstanding authorized stock are permitted to issue
shares in connection with this sort of tender offer. This is so because such corpora-
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tions may issue shares up to the authorized limit regardless of the procedures statu-
torily prescribed for charter amendments, the compliance with which would con-
flict with the tender offer regulatory provisions.
If the offer is made as a result of a sale of control, the offeror must disclose the
terms and conditions set forth in the sale of control agreement and explain the way
in which the sale price was calculated. The offeror must also reveal the extent of its
participation in the target company's capital and the purpose of its offer. It must
disclose any intentions to alter the target company's structure by means of merger,
consolidation, or change in legal form (for example, from corporation to partner-
ship) and it must reveal any plans to integrate the target as a division of a larger
company or to cause it to go private. Finally, the offeror must inform the target
company shareholders of its intentions to maintain, expand, diversify or alter the
company's line of goods and/or services.
Disclosures must be accurate and complete. It is unlawful to misrepresent or
omit material facts about the offer, the companies involved or the offerors's plans.
In the event of non-disclosures or omissions, criminal, civil, and administrative pen-
alties may be imposed upon directors and officers of the offering company and the
financial institution. In compulsory tender offer situations insiders of the target
company may also be subject to such penalties.
Until the tender offer is announced and thereby made public, the offeror, the
financial institution, the stock exchanges and the Securities Commission are all
bound to secrecy concerning the impending tender offer. Market manipulation and
defensive maneuvers on the part of controlling shareholders and incumbent manage-
ment are thereby minimized or eliminated. Breach of the duty of secrecy subjects
the offenders to the full range of penalties discussed earlier.
Tender offers are considered to be irrevocable, even in the situation where a
competing offer is announced [20]. If the latter event occurs, it nullifies all sell
orders previously signed in acceptance of the first tender offer. The first offeror's
only recourse in such a case is to improve his offer by raising the price or to post-
pone the closing date of the offer so as to make it coincide with that of the com-
peting tender offer. A price increase can be made only once and must be at least 5%
of the original price. Furthermore, it must be effective at least ten days before
expiration of the offering period and it must be retroactive to all shares taken up
before the price increase.
The required minimum offering period varies with the type of tender offer being.
made. Compulsory tender offers must remain open for at least thirty days; volun-
tary tender offers must remain open for at least twenty days. Tendered shares may
be taken up until the last day of the offer.
The minimum number of shares which can be sought in a tender offer depends
on the number of shares owned by the controlling shareholder. If control is exer-
cised by shareholders owning the absolute majority of the company's voting stock,
the amount to be acquired must be equal to 50% or more of the equity. If, on the
other hand, control is based upon ownership of a minority interest, the amount of
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol3/iss2/1
M. Carvalhosa / Brazilian experience of tender offers
shares sought to be acquired must be equal to the percentage necessary to exercise
such control. In actuality, it is impossible to determine a priori whether a tender
offer for a block of shares is aimed at acquiring a minority interest in, or control of,
the target company. Under these circumstances the law governing acquisitions of
corporate control via tender offer must be contrued also to apply to tender offers
for blocks of stock.
The number of shares necessary to constitute a block of shares is equal to the
number of voting shares which enable the holders thereof to elect members of the
company's board of directors. Ownership of 10% of the company's voting stock
entitles the shareholder to request the action of the Fiscal Council and to elect one
of its members; it also entitles the shareholder to request adoption of cumulative
voting for the election of members of the board of directors. Thus, acquisition of
10% or more of the voting stock of the company is deemed acquisition of a block
of stock. The articles of incorporation of some companies grant preferred shares
voting power thus enabling the owners thereof to elect one or more members of
the board. In such instances, if a transaction involves the transfer of preferred stock
of the company, a tender offer to the minority shareholders should be mandatory.
Directors and officers of the offering company as well as of the target company
are charged with the obligation to act in the best interests of the target-company
shareholders. Thus, target company management must rigorously conform to the
equal treatment mandate of section 254. In addition, despite the fact that the law
is not explicit on the matter, target management should express its opinion con-
cerning the offer, especially if it believes that the offer is contrary to the share-
holders' best interests. This obligation exists because management stands in a
fiduciary position as regards the corporation and its shareholders. Management's
recommendation to reject or accept the offer must be legally and economically
based and it is held responsible for the sufficiency of the information given to the
shareholders in connection with such recommendations.
It has been suggested that management has the duty to commence litigation or
take other measures to block the offer if it believes the offer to be detrimental to
its shareholders. However, defensive tactics aimed solely at defeating the offer are
unlawful and considered an abuse of power. Thus, during the pendency of an offer,
manage should not be allowed to alter the company structure, distribute extra divi-
dends, issue new shares, or acquire its own shares for the sole purpose of thwarting
the offer. Controlling shareholders are similarly restricted.
While it is entitled to express its opinion regarding the offer, the target company
management may not interfere with a shareholder's ultimate decision whether to
accept or reject the offer. Acceptance of the tender offer is accomplished by
signing, in accordance with the terms set forth in the offering document, an irre-
vocable sale or exchange order addressed to the financial institution indicated in the
offering document.
There are three methods of payment for stock purchased in a tender offer: cash,
stock, or part cash and part stock. Cash payment is usually at a price higher than
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the market value of the tendered securities. When liquidity is short or non-existent,
the price may be equal to market vlaue. The precise offering price is generally fixed
by market forces. If the price is unfairlylow (although above market price), it is up to
the controlling shareholders or to interested third parties to make a competing offer
and thus raise the stakes. The price for stock acquired by private transfer of control
is, of course, fixed by the sale agreement. Stock payment can only take certain pre-
scribed forms: already issued stock, debentures, promoters' shares convertible into
equity securities, stock options, treasury shares, shares issued by a third party that
are part of the offeror's portfolio, and federal, state, and municipal bonds owned
by the offeror. A combination payment, that is stock and/or cash, presents a prob-
lem. Since some shareholders could potentially be receiving stock, and others cash,
there could be a violation of the equal treatment mandate. Therefore, the question
has been raised whether to consider this type of tender offer a single transaction or
two separate transactions. It is submitted here that this is only a single transaction
because there is only a single purpose involved, i.e. to acquire an interest in a target
company. Offeree shareholders in such a situation are well informed and aware
before acceptance of the offer that not everyone's consideration will have precisely
the same value.
5. Resolution 401 and the compulsory tender offer
Resolution 401 of the National Monetary Council interprets section 254 of the
Corporation Law and limits the powers of the Securities Commission to enforce-
ment of the section's equal treatment for minority shareholders rule. It defines
"transfer of control" [21] and its interpretations encompass such items as pro rata
procedures, offering period rules, intermediation by financial institutions, and con-
tents and publication of offering documents.
Some of its interpretations of the law are especially noteworthy and even trou-
blesome. For instance, the Resolution affords the offeror the opportunity to pro-
pose cash payment for minority shares, regardless of whether the transfer of control
agreement provides for installment payment for the controlling shares [22]. In that
case, the offering price to the minority shareholders must be equal to that agreed
upon by the offeror and controlling shareholder, less any interest charged by the
controlling shareholder to the offeror. It must be monitored by the Securities Com-
mission to ensure that the difference in price reflects the interest rate and the mone-
tary correction for inflation that prevailed at the time of the original transaction.
The Commission is empowered to revise the price if it determines that the minority
shareholders have been short-shrifted. Another problematic item in the Resolution
allows the offeror to deduct from the minority shares' price an amount correspond-
ing to the value of the commitments (e.g. corporate debts, intellectual property
rights) undertaken by the controlling shareholder [23]. Section 254 does not men-
tion such a price reduction anywhere. This price reduction contradicts the Corpora-
tion Law's goal of equal treatment for minority shareholders. It also serves as an
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example of the way in which the Council has broadened its own authority, going
beyond the procedural authority originally given to it. The Resolution's treatment
of voting versus non-voting stock is also problematic because it makes the equal
treatment rule applicable only to voting stock [24]. Consequently, non-voting
stockholders are not recipients of a tender offer in the event of a transfer of con-
trol. Section 254 of the Corporation Law does not make this distinction; rather, it
speaks only of "minority shareholders". If one takes the view that non-voting stock
should be excluded because it confers upon its owner no control over the company,
then the Council's interpretation is both reasonable and logical. However, when the
Corporation Law created common and preferred stock, it aimed at attaining a
balance between different shareholders' interests by allowing the corporations to
suppress preferred shareholders' voting rights and instead offer them financial bene-
fits not available to common stock shareholders. To exclude the preferred share-
holders from the equal treatment rule would diminish their expected equity benefits
considerably. This financial harm would contradict the very purpose for which the
Corporation Law established non-voting preferred stock [25].
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Notes
[1] The public announcement of the takeover attempt was made on October 15 in Porto
Alegre, capital of the State of Rio Grande de Sul. As it turned out, the attempt failed and
Macrosul withdrew its offer. However, the question of the legality of the attempted takeover
became a controversial subject and the beginning of the push toward tender offer regulation.
[2] The purpose behind this policy was to shrink the then disproportionate size of the
banking sector. The result of the policy was formation of financial conglomerates that operate
in all credit and investment sectors of the financial market, and that provide such additional
services as leasing, insurance and pension funds.
[3] Created by Law No. 4595 of December 31, 1964, the Central Bank of Brazil is a govern-
ment agency responsible for the execution of policies determined by the National Monetary
Council. In this capacity its relevant functions are to control all forms of credit, to authorize
the operation of financial institutions, to supervise such institutions, and to effect loan opera-
tions for banks.
It is not to be confused with the Bank of Brazil which is a governmental corporation,
organized to be the country's main executor of banking services. In this capacity it performs
numerous functions. As agent for the National Treasury it receives tax and other federal
revenue payments, provides for the execution and necessary payments of the country's general
budget, executes and controls the government's export policy, and collects voluntary deposits
from financial institutions.
[4] A notable exception to this practice occurred in November 1973: The Cooperativa dos
Produtores de Acitar e Alcool spontaneously extended its tender offer to the non-controlling
shareholders of the Companhia Unido dos Refinadores. This action was applauded publicly by
the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange.
[5] Brazil is a Federal Republic [Republica Federativa do Brasil] formed by a union of
states, a federal district, and territories, under a representative government. Legislative power is
exercised by a Congress formed by a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate. Deputies are elected
by direct popular vote, three per State. Judicial power is exercised by the Supreme Federal
Court, Federal Appellate Courts, Federal Judges, plus Military, Labor, and Electoral Courts.
The States have their own judiciary for state matters.
[6] The Council of Economic Development is the President's advisory council. Its plans
must be submitted to the Congress for approval.
[7] "In order to protect minority shareholders and develop the associative spirit amongst
private business concerns, the Corporation Law shall be reformulated with a view to the follow-
ing objectives: to prevent each share of the majority holder from obtaining a higher market
value than that of the minority shareholder .... "
[8] Statement of Intent 14 of the Economic Development Council, dated June 25, 1974.
[91 Statement of Intent 196 of the Economic Development Council, dated June 24, 1976.
[10] Proposed legislation goes first to the Senate, then to the Chamber of Deputies for
approval.
[11] Law No. 6404 of December 15, 1976.
[12] Created by Law No. 4595 of December 31, 1964, the National Monetary Council is
the top level policy-making agency for Brazil's financial system. Its responsibilities include,
but are not limited to: coordinating the internal and external monetary, credit, budgetary,
fiscal and public debt policies; regulating the formation and operation of financial institutions;
and establishing policies and rules for the capital markets. The Council is composed of the fol-
lowing members: Ministers of Finance, Economic Planning and Industry and Commerce; Presi-
dents of the Central Bank of Brazil, the Bank of Brazil, the National Bank of Economic Devel-
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opment, and the National Housing Bank; Chairman of the Securities Commission (CVM); and
three persons appointed by the President from among citizens of high moral standing and well
known for their expertise in financial and economic matters.
[131 The Securities Commission, created by Law No. 6385 of December 5, 1976, is a gov-
ernment agency linked both to the Ministry of Finance and to the Executive. It is administered
by five commissioners, one of whom acts as Chairman. All five are appointed directly by the
President and may be dismissed ad nutum. The Chairman is a voting member of the National
Monetary Council.
The Commission is charged with regulation and control of the following activities: (1) issu-
ance and distribution of securities in the market; (2) trading and brokerage in the securities
market; (3) organization and operation of, and transactions on, the stock exchanges; (4) admin-
istration of securities portfolios and the custody of securities; (5) auditing of open companies;
and (6) services rendered by securities consultants and analysts.
Securities include (1) shares, founders' shares, debentures and their respective coupons and
subscription bonuses, (2) certificates of deposit of securities, and (3) any other securities
created or issued by corporations at the discretion of the National Monetary Council.
[14] Pursuant to Central Bank Resolution 39 the stock exchanges are empowered to super-
vise their brokers' activities and to provide the market with certain commercial and operational
information. In addition, pursuant to the Securities Commission Law, Law No. 6385 of Decem-
ber 7, 1976, the stock exchanges have administrative and financial autonomy and are con-
sidered to be ancillary organs of the Securities Commission.
[15] Law No. 6404, art. 116.
[16] rd., arts. 116 and 117, respectively.
[17] National Monetary Council Resolution 401, item IV.
[18] Id., item XVIII.
[19] Securities Commission Directive 3 (Instrufa-o CVM No. 03 de l 7deAgosto de 1978),
item IX.
[201 A question that arises in connection with competing offers is whether it would be law-
ful to have a competing offer when the original one is compulsory, i.e. arising out of a private
sale of corporate control. In such a case, it is submitted, a competing tender offer would be per-
fectly lawful. The competing offer, however, would be restricted to minority stock since the
control stock would already have been acquired by the offeror.
[21 ] National Monetary Council Resolution 401, item 2.
[22] Id., item 14.
[23] Id., item 15.
[24] Id., item 1.
[25] Such a result also would support the view that publicly held companies should not be
allowed to issue significant numbers of non-voting shares.
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